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INSIDER TRADING, SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE, AND
PROMPT DISCLOSURE:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
MARC I. STEINBERG*
The United States securities law framework may be perceived
as a model to be adapted to the culture and needs of other jurisdic-
tions.' Included within this framework are issues focusing on in-
sider trading and company affirmative disclosure practices. Ex-
amining U.S. law on these subjects, however, reveals a regime that
at times fails to accord fair treatment to market participants and
impedes commercial certainty.2 Countries abroad thus may be ill
served by embracing the U.S. model in these areas. Indeed, with
respect to these areas, a survey of the securities laws of developed
markets reveals that these countries have rejected the U.S. ap-
proach.3 Rather, by adhering to an insider trading prescription
premised on participant equal access to material nonpublic infor-
mation,4 a number of these countries reflect the U.S. law in the pre-
Chiarellas era.
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Given the ambiguity and complexity of U.S. law in these areas,
the Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") may be advised to assess the regulatory framework in cer-
tain other countries and determine their feasibility of application to
the U.S. system. It may eventuate that key principles readily can
be implemented from favored securities jurisdictions in order to
enhance the clarity and efficiency of the U.S. framework.7
Regardless of its purported shortcomings, the U.S. securities
regime maintains a critical component that other countries thus far
have failed to achieve: an enforcement framework, based on gov-
ernment as well as private actions, that enhances compliance with
the law and facilitates the levying of sanctions should violations
occur.8 Effective enforcement is the key attribute of the U.S. secu-
rities law framework that distinguishes it from the regulatory
structure existing in other countries. Hence, although the contours
of U.S. securities law in the insider trading and company affirma-
tive disclosure areas may need refinement, effective enforcement
elevates the U.S. framework to preeminence among securities mar-
kets. Briefly put, it is far more beneficial for achieving market in-
tegrity and investor confidence to effectively implement imperfect
(yet palatable) securities laws than have admirable statutes that are
rarely or episodically enforced. 9
This article thus focuses on regulation of insider trading and
company affirmative disclosure in developed securities markets.
First, the U.S. regime is discussed. Thereafter, the securities laws
of selected developed markets are addressed in order to provide
contrasts to the U.S. approach. Last, the article focuses on a num-
ber of significant issues that merit exploration.
1. U.S. REGULATION
1.1. Insider Trading
1.1.1. Preeminence of Federal Law
The following discussion examines key aspects of U.S. law in
the insider trading and issuer affirmative disclosure areas. With
7 See, e.g., infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
9 See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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respect to insider trading regulation, federal law is the primary
source of regulation. ° Although some states, such as New York,
allow derivative suits against inside traders based on unjust en-
richment"l and perceived injury to the corporate enterprise,12 state
law often is unavailable in this context 13 For example, the nonrec-
ognition by state courts of an insider's disclosure obligation when
transactions occur on impersonal securities markets14 as well as
such courts' refusal to find the requisite injury to the corporation"
signify that allegedly aggrieved traders must turn to federal law to
seek redress'16
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193417 governs
short-swing trading by directors, officers, and ten percent equity
holders of publicly-held entities. Pursuant to Section 16(b), such
persons are subject to strict liability, requiring disgorgement of all
profit, if they buy and sell (or sell and buy) an equity security of a
subject entity within a six-month period. 8 Section 16 raises several
10 See generally WILUAMi WAiNG & MARC STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996 &
Supp. 2001)
11 See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910,912 (N.Y. 1969).
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 187-96 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying
Indiana law); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739,746 (Fla. 1975); WANG & STEINBERG,
supra note 10, § 16.1, at 1106 ("State law is rarely applied to stock market insider
trading.").
14 See, e.g., Van Shaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Van Shaack, 867 P.2d 892 (Colo.
1994); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932), Bailey v. Vaughan, 359 N.E.2d
599 (W. Va. 1987).
15 Sources cited note 14 supra. See Douglas M. Branson, Chaosing the Appropri-
ate Default Rule-Insider Trading Undfer State Law, 45 ALA. L. REV. 753, 767 (1994)
(describing the Florida Supreme Court's finding that a corporate president's act of
tipping, which enabled mutual fund clients to avoid a price drop of three dollars
per share, had not harmed the corporation); Thomas Lee Hazen, Corpirate Insider
Trading: Reawakening the Common Law, 39 WAsH. & LE L. REv. 845, 856-57 (1932)
(discussing the Florida Supreme Court's rejection of a derivative suit due to the
absence of any injury to the coproration).
16 STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 106-07. Note that certain state securities laws
may allow government and/or private actions based on alleged insider trading
violations. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 10 § 16A. See generally Marc Stein-
berg & Ralph Ferrara, Securities Practice: Federal and State Enforcement §§ 1201-
12-29 (1999 & Supp. 2000).
'7 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
is See, e.g., Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1931);
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). See generally PETER J.
RoMEo & ALAN L. DYE, SECION 16 REPoRTING GUIDE (2000).
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complex issues,' 9 including whether the statute has outlived its
usefulness and should be repealed.20 This article declines to enter
the Section 16 fray, focusing instead on the securities acts'
antifraud provisions which constitute the essence of insider trading
regulation in the United States.
1.1.2. Rejection of Access and Parity Theories
Under U.S. law, no statute codifies the contours of the insider
trading prohibition. Rather, the federal courts and the SEC are the
principal actors. Prior to U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the
1980s, lower courts adhered to the parity of information 2 and
equal access approaches 22 when interpreting the "disclose or ab-
stain" mandate of Exchange Act section 10(b)23 (and SEC Rule 10b-
524) in the insider trading setting. Under the parity of information
theory, as enunciated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, "anyone in possession of material inside information must
either disclose it to the investing public, or... must abstain from
19 For example, these issues include the concepts of beneficial ownership and
attribution, identifying which persons may be officers, and applying the objective
versus the pragmatic approach. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Pe-
troleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973) (regarding beneficial ownership); CBI Indus.,
Inc. v. Horton, 682 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1982) (regarding attribution); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1978) (regarding
corporate officers); Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,709 at 81,248 (1991) (regarding compliance
with Section 16).
20 See Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trad-
ing: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 313 (1989) ("[T]his Article
concludes that section 16(b) is an archaic, blunt weapon which no longer serves a
useful purpose in the effort to deter insider trading."). But See Steve Thel, The
Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1991) (suggesting that section 16 promotes the efficient opera-
tion of publicly held corporations by deterring corporate officers from manipu-
lating corporate affairs for their own ends). See generally Marc I. Steinberg &
Daryl L. Lansdale, Jr., The Judicial and Regulatory Constriction of Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 33 (1992) (discussing the
parameters of section 16(b)).
21 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc); infra note 25 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,
445 U.S. 222 (1980); infra note 26 and accompanying text.
23 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
24 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). See generally Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Stein-
berg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
263 (1980) (discussing Section 10(b) as an experiment in American Federalism).
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trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such
information remains undisclosed."2 5 The equal access theory, a
more narrow approach, posits that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or
not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may
not use this information to trade in securities without incurring an
affirmative duty to disclose."26 Insofar as tipper-tippee liability,
lower courts held that a tippee stood in the shoes of the tipper. A
tippee knowingly receiving material nonpublic information from a
tipper, when such tipper could not trade on that information, like-
wise was subject to the disclose or abstain mandate As will be
discussed in the article's next section, a number of countries by
statute adhere to at least some of the foregoing principles.3
Today, the parity of information and equal access approaches
for Section 10(b) purposes no longer retain validity.3 Rather, as
construed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the breadth of the insider
trading proscription under Section 10(b) is premised on principles
based on fiduciary duty and trust and confidence. 0 Other key
concepts in this context include the materiality3' of the particular
information and whether that information is confidential (namely,
whether it has been adequately disseminated and absorbed by the
investment community).32
25 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,848 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc).
26 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1353,1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222(1980).
27 See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1930); Sha-
piro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
2s See infra notes 177-93 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (holding that the recipient of
material nonpublic information about a corporation has no duty to abstain from
use of the information where the tipper received no benefit from revealing the in-
formation nor pretended to give a gift of valuable information to the tippee); Chi-
arella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,223 (1980) (holding that a duty to disclose un-
der section 10(b) "does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information.").
30 See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (opining that such liability "is premised
upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence").
31 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232, 240 n. 18 (1938); Ganino
v. Citizens Utilities Company, 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000); SEC v. Mayhew, 121
F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993) (deciding
on whether there was sufficient evidence that certain information was material
and nonpublic); In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 244,256 (1973); STEINBERG, supra note
1, at 109-10. From a general perspective:
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Hence, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, trading on
the basis of material nonpublic information by a director, officer, or
other insider (e.g., a controlling shareholder) in the subject com-
pany's securities is prohibited under Section 10(b) because, by en-
gaging in such trading, such person breaches a fiduciary duty
owed to the company and to the parties on the opposite side of the
transactions, namely, the company's shareholders.3 3 Accordingly,
a disclosure obligation arises in this context from a relationship of
trust and confidence between the transacting participants.3 4 Like-
wise, the subject company's consultants, including lawyers, ac-
countants, and bankers, who become privy to material nonpublic
information with the understanding that this information must
remain confidential, are defined as quasi-insiders and thereby are
deemed to have a relationship of trust and confidence with the
company and its shareholders.3a Such persons accordingly are
subject to the disclose or abstain mandate, to wit, that they must
adequately disclose the material information to the marketplace or
abstain from trading (as well as tipping) until such dissemination
is effected.36 Nonetheless, insiders, who elect to make adequate
disclosure prior to their trade(s) (or tip(s)), violate the corporation's
need for confidentiality regarding such information and incur state
law liability exposure.37
[Mjaterial information becomes public in either of two ways. The first
view is that information that is disseminated and absorbed by the in-
vestment community is public. The second view is premised on the effi-
cient market theory, and under this view, information is deemed public
when the active investment community is aware of such information.
Under the efficient market theory, information that is known by the in-
vestment community will be reflected in the price of an efficiently traded
security.
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 3.03 (2001).
33 See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 ("Application of a duty to disclose prior to
trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the
shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through
fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.").
34 Id.
35 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n. 14 (1983).
36 Id. ("The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such
persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have en-
tered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the
enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.").
37 See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 110-11; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 10, §
5.2.2.
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In regard to "outsiders," namely, those individuals who do not
have a fiduciary obligation to those who trade on the other side of
the subject transactions, the misappropriation theory may be in-
voked.38 Under this theory, a Section 10(b) violation occurs when
the subject actor misappropriates material nonpublic information
for securities trading objectives, resulting in breaching a relation-
ship of trust and confidence to the source of the information, irre-
spective whether such source is or is not a party to the trade.3 9 Ac-
cordingly, an employee who misappropriates material confidential
information entrusted to her employer and who uses such infor-
mation for securities trading purposes breaches a relationship of
trust and confidence to her employer and perhaps to her em-
ployer's clients.4
Turning to unlawful "tipping" under Section 10(b), the critical
inquiries are whether the tipper breached his fiduciary duty (or a
relationship of trust and confidence) by communicating the subject
information to his tippee(s) and whether the subject tippee(s) knew
or should have known of the breach. 41 Without the finding of a
breach, a tippee may trade and tip without violating Section
10(b) 42Consistent with Supreme Court analysis, an insider is held
to breach his fiduciary duty by tipping the subject information
while having the motivation to receive a personal benefit Such
personal benefit normally is of a pecuniary nature, such as cash or
elevation in status that will result in future financial benefits.43 A
gift also is deemed a sufficient personal benefit the gift of tipping
the material nonpublic information is likened to trading by the in-
38 See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 US. 642 (1997).
39 Id. at 2207.
40 Id.; see United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1931); Steinberg, su-
pra note 1, at 111. See generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 10, at § 5.4 (2001
Supp.); Bromberg & Lowenfels, Misappropriation in thw Suprene Court, 31 REv. SEc.
& COMM. REG. 37 (1998); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing t1 Misappropriation Theory of
Insider Trading Liability: A Post - O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. LJ. 1223 (1993);
Steven A. Rarnirez & Christopher M. Gilbert, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading Under United States v. O'Hagan: Vizy Its Bark Is Worse l7an Its Bite, 26 SEc.
REG. LJ. 162 (1998); Elliott J. Weiss, United States v. O'Hagan: Pragmatism Rettrns to
the Law ofInsider Trading, 23 J. CoRP. L 395 (1993).
41 Dirks v. SEC, 463 US. 646 (1983).
42 See id. at 661-62 ("All disclosures of confidential corporate information are
not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe shareholders.").
43 Id. at 662-64.
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sider himself with the transfer to the tippee-recipient of the profits
generated from the trades.44
1.1.3. Rule 14e-3 -Insider Trading in the Tender Offer Setting
In contrast to the Section 10(b) jurisprudence of insider trading
is SEC Rule 14e-3 which applies only in the tender offer setting.45
In this limited context, the proscriptions against trading and tip-
ping on material confidential information are significantly broader.
Under Rule 14e-3, a person who obtains material confidential in-
formation regarding a tender offer directly or indirectly from the
offeror (bidder), target corporation, or an intermediary neither can
trade nor tip prior to adequate public disclosure (and absorption)
of such information.46 In addition, a tippee of material confiden-
tial information relating to a tender offer who knows or should
know that the subject information comes directly or indirectly from
an offeror, target corporation or intermediary similarly cannot
trade or tip prior to adequate public disclosure (and absorption) of
this information.47 Rule 14e-3 provides an exception to this expan-
sive disclose or abstain rule for multi-service financial institutions
which adopt and implement sufficient screening mechanisms that
effectively prevent the flow of confidential information to those
who effect or recommend trades in the subject company's securi-
ties.48
44 Id. at 664 (opining that "[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider
himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient"); Steinberg, supra note 1,
at 111; see Bruce A. Hiler, Dirks v. SEC-A Study in Cause and Effect, 43 MD. L. REV.
292, 318 (1984) ("The Dirks Court itself begins this process when it creates a per se
rule or an irrebuttable presumption of personal benefit when 'an insider makes a
gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend."').
45 General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3 (2001). Rule 14e-3 was adopted in Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release
No. 17120, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,646 at 83,453 (Sept.
4,1980).
46 See Rule 14e-3(a), (d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a), (d). The Supreme Court up-
held Rule 14e-3's validity in United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
47 Rule 14e-3(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d).
48 Rule 14e-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b), STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 112; see
SEC Division of Market Regulation, "Broker-Dealer Policies and Procedures De-
signed to Segment the Flow and Prevent the Misuse of Material Nonpublic Infor-
mation," [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,520 (1990);
Theodore A. Levine et al., Multiseruice Securities Firms: Coping With Conflicts in a
Tender Offer Context, 23 WAKE FoRESr L. REV. 41 (1988); Marc Steinberg & John
Fletcher, Compliance Programs for Insider Trading, 47 SMU L. Rev. 1783 (1994).
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1.1.4. Critique of U.S. Insider Trading Lam
United States law on insider trading is far from laudable. To-
day, as a result of Supreme Court decisions, concepts focusing on
fiduciary duty, misappropriation, and financial benefit determine
the propriety of transactions consummated or contemplated. The
objective of ensuring that ordinary investors are on an equal foot-
ing with market professionals to access material nonpublic infor-
mation is no longer viable under Section 10(b) insider trading ju-
risprudence. 49 Although Congress clearly intended the federal
securities acts to extend greater investor protection than state law,
the Supreme Court's foremost reliance on state law premised on
concepts of fiduciary duty slights that congressional objective.SO
Indeed, the SEC, acting ostensibly within its rulemaking
authority, has sought to minimize restrictive Supreme Court law.
One example is the SEC's promulgation of Rule 14e-3 which sets
forth expansive parity of information and anti-tipping mandates in
the tender offer context.51 In the Section 10(b) setting, the Commis-
sion has advocated a broad construction of Supreme Court prece-
dent,52 even prescribing new rules that in effect "overturn" lower
49 See supra notes 21-44 and accompanying text.
50 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,245-52 (1979) (Bla"ckmun, J., dis-
senting). As Justice Blackmun opined:
By its narrow construction of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Court places the
federal securities laws in the rearguard of this movement, a position op-
posite to the expectations of Congress at the time the securities laws were
enacted .... I cannot agree that the statute and Rule are so limited. The
Court has observed that the securities laws were not intended to repli-
cate the law of fiduciary relations. Rather, their purpose is to ensure the
fair and honest functioning of impersonal national securities markets
where common-law protections have proved inadequate. As Congress
itself has recognized, it is integral to this purpose "to assure that dealing
in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among
investors."
Id. at 248 (citations omitted); see also Alison Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and In-
sider Trading, 10 HoFsrP AL. REV. 341 (1982); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating
State Law Fiduciary Duties Into the Federal Insider Trading Pro hibition, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. Rev. 1189 (1995).
51 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
52 Two such examples are the SEC's assertion that applicable Supreme Court
decisions allow for broad interpretations of trading "on the basis of" inside infor-
mation and the requisite "benefit" for tipping purposes. See, e.g., SEC v. Adler,
137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting SEC's assertion but adopting a presump-
tion of use when one trades while knowingly possessing material nonpublic in-
formation); SEC v. Stevens, SEC Litigation Release No. 12,813 (Mar. 19,1991) (de-
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court authority. 3 In another recent regulatory action, the SEC
adopted Regulation FD that seeks to terminate the practice by
companies of selectively disclosing material nonpublic information
to market professionals and favored shareholders. 54 While these
selective disclosure practices constitute illegal insider tipping un-
der the laws of many countries55 and indeed were illegal in this
country prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks,56 such con-
duct is impermissible under Section 10(b) today only if the tipper is
motivated by a desire to personally benefit from the selective dis-
closure.5 7
Some concrete examples illustrate the erratic treatment of in-
sider trading law in the United States. One striking illustration is
the different treatment accorded to tender offers due to SEC Rule
14e-3.58 Literally, an individual can legally retain profits by trading
on material inside information or be held liable simply by the for-
tuity of whether a tender offer is implicated. For example, Barry
Switzer, the former football coach of the Dallas Cowboys and the
University of Oklahoma, inadvertently received material nonpub-
lic information from a key corporate executive relating to a forth-
scribing settlement where SEC alleged that insider received personal benefit un-
der Dirks test by "tipping" inside information to securities analysts).
53 See General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC
Rules 10b5-1,17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1, adopted in, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154,
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCd-) 86,319 (2000). By adopting in
Rule 10b5-1 a broad "awareness" test rather than a "use" standard for determin-
ing when trading is "on the basis" of material nonpublic information, the SEC re-
jected the standards set forth in at least two appellate court decisions. See United
States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir.
1998); Horowitz & Bitar, Insider Trading: New SEC Rules and an Important New Case,
28 Sec. Reg. LJ. 364 (2000); Donna M. Nagy, The "Possession vs. Use" Debate in the
Context of Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden,
67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1129 (1999). Moreover, by its promulgation of Rule 10b5-2, the
SEC has "overturned" the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Chestiman,
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (discussed infa notes 66-77 and accompany-
ing text).
m See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCLH) 86,319 (2000) (discussion infa notes 88-115 and accompany-
ing text).
55 See infa notes 176-86,195-96 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
57 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
58 For a description of Rule 14e-3, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text.
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coming merger transaction.5 9 Knowing the information to be reli-
able because of his relationship with the insider, Switzer (along
with his cronies) traded on the basis of this information and made
a handsome profit.60 In that the insider was unaware of Switzer
being privy to the communications at issue, the court held there
was no unlawful tipping.6' Because the tippee's liability under
Section 10(b) is derivative in nature,62 the finding that the insider-
tipper did not breach his fiduciary duty signified that Switzer as
the tippee traded lawfully, and, hence, was entitled to keep his
profits.63
The result in Switzer would have been entirely different if the
subject transaction had been structured as a tender offer rather
than a merger. In that event, Rule 14e-3 as well as Section 10(b)
would have applied. Although Switzer would have avoided li-
ability under Section 10(b), he would have violated Rule 14e-3 by
trading on material nonpublic information that he knew derived
from a reliable inside source.64 Hence, pursuant to Rule 14e-3, irre-
spective of the tipper's liability, a tippee incurs liability by know-
ingly trading on material inside information that directly or indi-
rectly derives from a subject corporation.65  Thus, Switzer's
avoidance of liability and lawful retention of significant profits
were owed to the manner in which the affected transaction was
structured.
This inconsistency becomes more poignant when the Clest-
man66 scenario, involving a criminal prosecution, is considered.
There, the Second Circuit en banc held that Chestman was not li-
able under Section 10(b) because his tipper breached no fiduciary
duty by conveying material inside information relating to a forth-
coming tender offer.67 Nonetheless, Chestman's criminal convic-
tion under Rule 14e-3 was upheld due to that he knowingly traded
59 SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756,758,762 (W.D. Okla. 1934).
60 Id. at 762-64.
61 Id. at 766.
62 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. at 660-64; see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying
text.
63 590 F. Supp. at 764-66.
64 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2001).
65 Id.; see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 636-91; supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text;, infra note 68 and accompanying text.
66 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
67 Id. at 570-71.
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while in possession of material nonpublic information relating to a
tender offer that derived, directly or indirectly, from a subject cor-
porate source.68 Thus, while Chestman avoided Section 10(b) i-
ability because his tipper did not unlawfully tip, Chestman was
subject to incarceration because, unfortunately for Chestman, the
structure of the transaction took the form of a tender offer rather
than another feasible acquisition alternative, such as a merger or
sale of assets. Such inconsistency cannot be reconciled with market
integrity, investor protection, or basic concepts of fair treatment
among similar market participants.69
The Chestman case has another troubling aspect. In ascertain-
ing whether a fiduciary duty existed so as to trigger the disclose or
abstain mandate,70 the Second Circuit held that marriage, standing
alone, does not manifest a fiduciary relationship.7 To have such a
relationship of trust and confidence, there must exist other attrib-
utes, such as an understanding to keep the material information
confidential or a pre-existing pattern of being privy to family busi-
ness secretsZ2 In addition to minimizing "family values," one can
understandably be concerned about the law giving greater sanctity
to a shareholder's relationship with a director of a publicly-held
company (with whom such shareholder has never spoken or met)
than to one's spouse, child, sibling, or parent. Such an approach is
68 Id. at 556-64. Note, moreover, that "Rule 14e-3 does not require that a per-
son charged with violating the rule have knowledge that the nonpublic informa-
tion in his possession relates to a tender offer." SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 79 (1st
Cir. 2000). Accord, United States v. O'Hagan 139 F.3d 641, 650 (8th Cir. 1998);
Tender Offers, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 17,120 (1980) 1980 SEC
LEXIS 775.
69 See, e.g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775-76 (1979) (stating that
purposes of Securities Act include "investor protection," achieving "a high stan-
dard of business ethics... in every facet of the securities industry," and observing
that "the welfare of investors and financial intermediaries are inextricably
linked-frauds perpetrated upon either business or investors can redound to the
detriment of the other and to the economy as a whole.").
70 See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
71 947 F.2d at 571 (stating that "Keith's status as Susan's husband could not
itself establish fiduciary status").
72 Id. at 568-71. But see SEC v. Lenfest, 949 F. Supp. 341, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding that a wife could be held liable for trading on material information she
received from her husband); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 712 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (stating that a "confidential relationship concept... has reference to any re-
lationship of blood, business friendship, or association in which the parties repose
special confidence in each other .... "), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.
1985).
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an outcome of the U.S. Supreme Court's focus on the existence of a
fiduciary relationship (or a relationship of trust and confidence)
based on state law principles. Without a rule premised on equal
access, state law notions of fiduciary duty can trigger, as it did in
Chestman, an absurd result . 3 By adopting Rule 10b5-2,74 the SEC
effectively has nullified this aspect of Chwstman. The rule impli-
cates the misappropriation theory under Section 10(b) where a per-
son receives material nonpublic information from a spouse, child,
sibling, or parent unless such person can establish that, due to the
particular family relationship, there existed no reasonable expecta-
tion of confidentiality. 5 One can certainly question whether the
SEC's interpretation will be upheld.7 6 After all, the Commission in
practical effect has "overturned" a decision rendered by the U.S.
Court of Appeals?"
From an overall perspective, the conclusion seems inescapable
that U.S. law on insider trading is far from ideal. Statutes are
largely silent on insider trading 8 thus leaving this subject to the
73 In a separate opinion, Judge Winter reasoned:
[F]amily members who have benefited from the family's control of the
corporation are under a duty not to disclose confidential corporate in-
formation that comes to them in the ordinary course of family affairs. In
the case of family-controlled corporations, family and business affairs
are necessarily intertwined, and it is inevitable that from time to time
normal familial interactions will lead to the revelation of confidential
corporate matters to various family members. Indeed, the very nature of
familial relationships may cause the disclosure of corporate matters to
avoid misunderstandings among family members or suggestions that a
family member is unworthy of trust.
947 F.2d. at 579 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2001).
75 Id.; see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 86,319, at 83,695-97 (Aug.
15, 2000).
76 Cf. The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invali-
dating SEC Rule 19c-4).
77 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,228, at 82,863-82,864 (1999) (expressing dissatisfac-
tion with Chestman as being too restrictive).
79 Statutory treatment exists with respect to certain issues relating to insider
trading, such as "short-swing" trading, option traders, the ability of contempora-
neous traders to bring a private right of action, the levying of money penalties,
and the adoption of specific mechanisms to be implemented by broker-dealers
and investment advisers. See, e.g., Sections 16, 20(d), 20A, 21A of the Securities
Exchange Act, discussed in WANG AND & STEINBERG, supra note 10, §§ 6.2, 6.3, 6.8,
7.3.3; supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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courts. The U.S. Supreme Court, rejecting the parity of information
and equal access doctrines, has focused on traditional state law is-
sues of fiduciary duty.79 This approach, in turn, as exemplified by
the Chestman and Switzer cases, 80 has led to illogical lower court de-
cisions. On another front, the SEC, seeking to combat restrictive
Supreme Court decisions under the Section 10(b) law of insider
trading, has asserted expansive interpretations of those decisions.81
The Commission, thus faced with frustration regarding its now
limited authority under Section 10(b), has responded by promul-
gating Rules 14e-3 and Regulation FD.82 The ultimate consequence
is all too often the presence of inconsistent and erratic insider
trading regulation that ill serves the investing public. Hence, the
U.S. framework on insider trading is not one to be emulated.
Other countries evidently agree.83
1.2. Selective Disclosure - Regulation FD
Unlike many developed securities markets,84 company selective
disclosure practices until recently generally were not proscribed by
U.S. law. Unless it could be shown that the insider selectively dis-
closed with the motivation to personally benefit, 5 this course of
conduct (outside of the tender offer context) did not run afoul of
the securities laws. In effect, selective disclosure without motiva-
tion of personal benefit enabled lawful tipping and tippee trading
by select persons based on material information that was not dis-
seminated to the investing public.86
The perpetuation of this practice largely was owed to the in-
adequacy of U.S. insider trading law enunciated by the U.S. Su-
7 See supra notes, 30, 33-35,50 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
82 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (Rule 14e-3); infra notes 84-115
and accompanying text (Regulation FD).
83 See infra notes 138-93 and accompanying text.
84 See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
85 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-64; supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
86 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCh) 82,846 (SEC 1999) (in proposing Regulation FD opining
that, in view of the personal benefit test, "many have viewed Dirks as affording
considerable protection to insiders who make selective disclosures to analysts,
and to the analysts (and their clients) who receive selectively disclosed informa-
tion.").
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preme Court.F Frustrated with its inability to effectively address
this perceived unfair practice, the SEC promulgated Regulation FD
(Fair Disclosure).88
Hence, the SEC adopted Regulation FD in response to the per-
ceived unfairness when companies selectively disclose material
nonpublic information to analysts, institutional investors, and
other securities market insiders. The Regulation's basic premise
provides that "when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, dis-
closes material nonpublic information to [selective] persons..., it
must make public disclosure of that information."89 The timing of
when the issuer must make such a public disclosure depends on
whether the selective disclosure was intentional or non-intentional.
If the selective disclosure is intentional, then the issuer must
publicly disclose the information simultaneously by filing or fur-
nishing a Form 8-K to the SEC or in a manner reasonably designed
to provide broad distribution of the information. If the selective
disclosure is unintentional, then the issuer must disclose the in-
formation to the public promptly, but in no event after the later of
24 hours or the opening of the next day's trading on the New York
Stock Exchange. Violating Regulation FD exposes the issuer to
SEC administrative and civil enforcement action, but does not by
itself impose any Section 10(b) antifraud liability on the issuer or
establish a private right of action.90
1.2.1. Purposes of Regulation FD
The SEC sought to address several concerns by promulgating
Regulation FD. First, it believed that issuers often disclose impor-
tant nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings
results, to securities analysts and/or institutional investors before
87 See Daniel J. Kramer, Speaking to the Market Under SEC's Pro osed Rules,
N.Y. L.J., May 12,2000 at 1 (stating that "[i]n contrast to'tipping,' ... selective dis-
closure is not unlawful because it is authorized by the issuer and made to a per-
son who is not bound by a duty of trust or confidence to abstain from using the
information for trading."). On occasion, the SEC initiated enforcement action
against a subject insider alleging that such person with the intention to personally
benefit conveyed material nonpublic information to securities analysts. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Stevens, SEC Litigation Release No. 12,813 1991 SEC LEXIS 451 (ar. 19,
1991).
Ss Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154,
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC.H) 86,319, at 83,676 (Aug. 15, 2000).
9 Id. at 83,676.
90 Id. at 83,685-88, 83,691-92.
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making such information available to the general investing public.
The Commission warned that as a result of this practice, the in-
vesting public might not believe that they are on an equal playing
field with market insiders and may thereby lose confidence in the
integrity of the securities markets. Second, the SEC stated that se-
lective disclosure closely resembles the "tipping" of inside infor-
mation, but noted that the current state of insider trading law may
not create liability for an issuer's selective disclosure.91 Third, the
Commission perceived that the integrity of the securities markets
was threatened by issuers selectively disclosing information as a
means to secure favorable reviews by analysts. Specifically, ana-
lysts may feel pressured to report about a company in a positive
light or risk losing their access to company personnel. Finally, the
SEC opined that recent technological advances, particularly in the
communications area, no longer pose undue impediments to
timely public disclosure. 92
1.2.2. Scope of Regulation FD
Regulation FD's scope focuses on those who are prohibited
from selectively disclosing material nonpublic information and
those to whom such selective disclosure is directed. The Regula-
tion prohibits a company, or persons acting on such company's be-
half, from selectively disclosing material inside information re-
garding such company or its securities.93 For the purpose of the
Regulation, an issuer includes a company that has a class of secu-
91 "[I]n light of the 'personal benefit' test set forth in the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), many have viewed issuer selective dis-
closures to analysts as protected from insider trading liability." Id. at 83,677 n.7.
Nevertheless, the Commission reiterated that it would institute enforcement ac-
tions based on violations of Section 10(b) where selective disclosures violated the
insider trading prohibitions. Id.; see supra notes 52, 87.
92 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,319 at 83,677-78; see also J.
Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 741, 808 (1985) (observing that "companies often attempt to main-
tain positive working relations with analysts, selectively tipping information to
particular analysts ... ."); Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the
Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. J. L. & TEcd. 263, 329 (1999) (stating
that "there is a strong incentive for an issuer to disclose to an analyst, given the
good that analysts can do for a company's stock price.").
93 Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2000).
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rities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or is required
to file reports under Section 15 of that Act. 94
Regulation FD defines a "person acting on behalf of an issuer"
as "any senior official of the issuer... or any other officer, em-
ployee, or agent of an issuer who regularly communicates with any
[enumerated recipient of information discussed below] ... , or with
holders of the issuer's securities." 95 This definition focuses on
those whose job function regularly entails the disclosure of com-
pany-related information to the enumerated recipients. Selective
disclosure by personnel who may occasionally interact with ana-
lysts or investors, for example, would not give rise to liability un-
der Regulation FD. Thus, material nonpublic information dis-
dosed in the due course of business to customers and suppliers
would be outside the scope of the Regulation. The Commission,
however, has noted that a senior official cannot escape liability by
directing non-covered personnel to make a selective disclosure of
information to someone within the classes of enumerated recipi-
ents. In such a case, the senior official would be held responsible
for making the selective disclosure under Section 20(b) of the Ex-
change Act. Finally, the definition of a "person acting on behalf of
an issuer" specifically excludes an "officer, director, employee, or
agent of an issuer who discloses material nonpublic information in
breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer."% Such con-
duct would violate the insider trading prohibitions.97
Regulation FD applies when material nonpublic information is
selectively disclosed to one of four enumerated classes of recipients
outside the issuer:
o a broker or a dealer, or a person associated with a bro-
ker or dealer;
* an investment adviser, an institutional investment
manager, or a person associated with either;
* an investment company or affiliated person thereof;
or
94 Id. § 243.101(b). Among other entities, the Regulation expressly excludes
from the definition of "issuer" any foreign government or foreign private issuer.
9 Id. § 243.101(c). The Regulation defines "senior official" as "any director,
executive officer, investor relations or public relations officer, or other person with
similar functions." Id. § 243.101(.
96 Id. § 243.101(c).
97 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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* a holder of the issuer's securities, where it is reasona-
bly foreseeable that the holder will purchase or sell the
issuer's securities based on the information.98
The Regulation expressly excludes, and thus does not apply to,
the following: a "person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to
the issuer" (e.g., temporary insider); a "person who expressly
agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence"; a
credit rating agency, "provided the information is disclosed solely
for the purpose of developing a credit rating and the entity's rat-
ings are publicly available"; and, with certain exceptions, in con-
nection with "a securities offering registered under the Securities
Act."99 Furthermore, although not specifically referenced, disclo-
sures to the media or communications to government agencies are
outside the Regulation's scope.
1.2.3. Meaning of "Material" and "Nonpublic"
Although the Regulation refers to "material" and "nonpublic"
information, it does not define those terms. Instead, the SEC relies
on case law to define these terms. Thus, information is material if
"there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in making an investment decision...
[and it is] a fact [that] would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information
made available." 00 Information is nonpublic "if it has not been
disseminated in a manner making [such information] available to
investors generally." 1°
98 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i)-(iv).
99 Id. § 243.100(b)(2). The Regulation lists attorneys, investment bankers, and
accountants as examples of those who may owe a duty of trust or confidence to
the issuer. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(i).
100 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,319, at 83,683 (Aug. 15, 2000),
quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The Regula-
tion FD Release also cites SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (Aug. 12,1999) (64
FR 45150) as authority supporting its definition of "materiality." See Ganino v.
Citizens Utils. Co, 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000).
101 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,319, at 83,683 (Aug. 15, 2000),
citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
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Although the Commission declined to establish a bright-line
test for materiality, it offered several examples of information that
likely would require issuers to make a materiality determination:
(1) earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers,
joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products or discover-
ies, or developments regarding customers or suppliers; (4) changes
in control or in management; (5) change in auditors; (6) events re-
garding the issuer's securities; and (7) bankruptcies or receiver-
ships. With this or any other information, the key for any materi-
ality determination is what significance a reasonable investor
would place on the information.102
1.2.4. Intentional or Non-Intentional Selective Disclosure
Another important issue under Regulation FD involves
whether the issuer selectively disclosed the information intention-
ally or non-intentionally. This assessment determines when the
issuer must make the information publicly available. If the issuer
intentionally and selectively discloses material nonpublic informa-
tion, then it must disclose the same information simultaneously to
the public. But if the selective disclosure is non-intentional, the is-
suer must disclose the information promptly, which is defined:
as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event
after the later of 24 hours or the commencement of
the next day's trading on the New York Stock Ex-
change) after a senior official of the issuer... learns
that there has been a non-intentional disclosure by
the issuer or person acting on behalf of the issuer of
information that the senior official knows, or is
reckless in not knowing, is both material and non-
public.10 3
The standard for determining whether a selective disclosure
was "intentional" meshes with the Regulation's definitions of ma-
teriality and nonpublic. The Regulation defines "intentional" to
mean that "the person making the disclosure either knows, or is
102 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,319, at 83,6S4 (Aug. 15, 200).
The SEC acknowledges that this information is not material per se. Id.
103 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2000).
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reckless in not knowing, that the information he or she is commu-
nicating is both material and nonpublic." 04 Thus, if an issuer were
merely negligent in erroneously judging whether a certain piece of
selectively disclosed information is either material or nonpublic,
Regulation FD would not impose liability. By using this standard,
the Commission seeks to provide "additional protection that issu-
ers need not fear being second-guessed by the Commission in en-
forcement actions for mistaken judgments regarding materiality in
close cases." 05 Nonetheless, the SEC warned that the determina-
tion of materiality should take into account all facts and circum-
stances. Thus, for example, a materiality judgment that might not
be reckless in the context of an impromptu answer to an unex-
pected question at a press conference may be reckless in the con-
text of a prepared written statement where the issuer has more
time to evaluate the information it is about to disclose. Further-
more, if an issuer displays a pattern of "mistaken" judgments re-
garding materiality, that company's credibility would be harmed
when it comes to future claims that any particular disclosure was
not intentional.
1.2.5. Methods For Making Public Disclosure
Regulation FD provides issuers with flexibility in determining
how to publicly disclose material nonpublic information when
they have engaged in selective disclosure of such information.
Whatever method the issuer chooses must be "reasonably de-
signed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the in-
formation to the public."10 6 One dear method that an issuer can
use is either to file or furnish a Form 8-K with the SEC.107 The
104 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
105 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,319, at 83,685 (Aug. 15, 2000)
(stating that "in the case of a selective disclosure attributable to a mistaken deter-
muination of materiality, liability will arise only if no reasonable person under the
circumstances would have made the same determination.").
106 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(2) (2000).
107 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(1) (2000). With respect to "filing" versus "furnish-
ing" the information on Form 8-K, the SEC stated:
[I]ssuers may choose either to "file" a report under Item 5 of Form 8-K or
to "furnish" a report under Item 9 of Form 8-K that will not be deemed
"filed." If an issuer chooses to file the information on Form 8-K, the in-
formation will be subject to liability under Section 18 of the Exchange
Act The information also will be subject to automatic incorporation by
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Regulation also provides that other methods of public disclosure
may be acceptable, such as press releases, press conferences, or
conferences that the public can attend or listen to by telephone or
teleconference. In using these alternatives, however, the issuer
must select a method or combination of methods that are reasona-
bly calculated to provide a broad and effective public disclosure
given that issuer's particular circumstances. Thus, for example, an
issuer cannot rely solely on issuing a press release if it knows that
its press releases are not routinely reported by the wire services.
Furthermore, even though the Internet can be an effective method
of disclosing information in conjunction with other methods, issu-
ers cannot simply post information on their own Internet website
as a sole means to satisfy Regulation FD's public disclosure re-
quirements. In addition, the Commission will take into account
whether a company deviated from its usual practices for making a
public disclosure in determining whether the method of disclosure
in any particular case complies with the Regulation.S
The SEC, recognizing that a single method of disclosure may
not be possible or desirable, offered a model for making a planned
disclosure of material information. First, the issuer should issue a
press release distributed through regular channels. Second, it
should provide adequate notice through a press release and/or
website posting of a scheduled conference call to discuss the par-
ticular information, giving investors information on the time and
date of the call as well as how to access it Third, the issuer should
hold the conference call in an open manner, such that investors can
listen to (but not necessarily ask questions during) the conference
call either over the telephone or the Internet The Commission also
reference into the issuer's Securities Act registration statements, which
are subject to liability under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.
If an issuer chooses instead to furnish the information, it will not be sub-
ject to liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act or Section 18 of the
Exchange Act for the disclosure, unless it takes steps to include that dis-
closure in a filed report, proxy statement, or registration statement. All
disclosures on Form 8-K, whether filed or furnished, will remain subject
to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154,
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCHi) 86,319, at 83,637 (Aug. 15,
2000).
10' Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 86,319, at 83,633 (Aug. 15,
2000).
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suggested that companies make taped replays of the conference
call available for some time after they take place so as to allow
other investors to listen to it.109
1.2.6. Exclusions
Because Regulation FD's disclosure requirements potentially
could have conflicted with concerns relating to an issuer's "condi-
tioning the market" during a registered offering, the Regulation
generally "does not apply to disclosures made in connection with a
securities offering registered under the Securities Act."" 0 Regis-
tered shelf offerings, however, fall within Regulation FD's scope.
Similarly, a reporting company's unregistered offerings are subject
to Regulation FD. The Commission noted that in the context of
such offerings, the company should either make selectively dis-
closed information public or secure a confidentiality agreement
from the recipient. It also warned public companies undertaking
unregistered offerings that if they fail to adhere to Regulation FD,
they may risk losing their exemption from registration. A com-
pany's failure to adhere to Regulation FD, however, will not cause
it to lose the availability of using short-form Securities Act regis-
tration forms S-2 or S-3 or cause its shareholders to lose their abil-
ity to sell their securities under Securities Act Rule 144(c)."'
1.2.7. SEC Enforcement, No Private Remedy
If an issuer violates Regulation FD, it will be subject to SEC en-
forcement action. The Commission, for example, could institute an
administrative action seeking a cease-and-desist order or a civil
action requesting an injunction and/or money penalties. The SEC
also could bring administrative or civil actions against individuals
affiliated with issuers who are responsible for violating the Regu-
lation.12 The Regulation, however, does not create any private
right of action. Furthermore, it expressly does not establish any
Section 10(b) antifraud liability for cases based "solely" on an is-
109 Id. 83,688 n.73.
110 Id. 83,689.
111 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.103 (2000).
112 See STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 16, §§ 4:07, 5:02-5:07, 5A:08-5A:18.
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suer's failure to comply with Regulation FD."1 Nevertheless, Sec-
tion 10(b) liability may still arise if, for example, the company's
public disclosure, designed to satisfy Regulation FD, contains a
material misstatement or omits material information.
1.2.8. Impact of Regulation FD
Critics of Regulation FD contend that it will have a "chilling ef-
fect" on issuers' dissemination of information.114 They believe that
the Regulation will deter companies from disclosing certain infor-
mation out of a concern for violating the Regulation. As a result,
investors will end up receiving less, not more, information. The
SEC, however, contends that the Regulation admirably serves in-
vestor interests, levels the "playing field," and has no "chilling ef-
fect" According to the SEC, the Regulation has been sufficiently
tailored to provide meaningful safeguards against inappropriate
liability. Moreover, the discipline and culture of the securities
markets will continue to induce issuers to disclose information
necessary for investors to make informed decisions. 15
1.3. Duty to Promptly Disclose - "Tie Black Hole"
In developed securities markets, it is axiomatic that, absent suf-
ficient business justification, material nonpublic information must
be promptly disclosed to the affected securities market(s).1 16 Per-
haps to the surprise of many outside observers, although this pol-
icy is espoused by stock exchange rules (that are rarely enforced
against listed companies)," 7 U.S. law does not require companies
to disclose material nonpublic information during the interval
113 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2000) ("No failure to make a public disclosure re-
quired solely by [Regulation FD] shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-
5... under the Securities Exchange Act.").
114 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) $ 86,319, at 83,679 (Aug. 15,
2000).
I's See id. 83,677. See generally Robert J. Conner, Regulation FD: Its Creation,
Its Authority, Its Possible Impact, 28 SEc. REG. L.J. 233, 278 (2001) (noting that "the
SEC will attain the goal it set out to accomplish with Regulation FD: to promote
investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities markets."); James
J. Junewicz, The SEC Raises the Stakes in Issuer-Analyst Comnmnications, 33 REV.
SEc. & Co.Nii. REG. 237 (2000).
116 See infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Company Manual §§ 202.01-202.0, 3
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,513.
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between the filing of periodic reports with the SEC.118 Nonethe-
less, if, for example, the company is issuing or trading its securities
in the markets," 9 has a duty to update previous disclosures
made,120 or rumors are prevalent that are attributable to the com-
pany,'21 then affirmative disclosure is required.122
This "black hole" in the U.S. continuous disclosure framework,
in practical effect, occurs most frequently where adverse financial
information exists relating to the subject company (also called "bad
news").123 Absent sound business reasons, companies normally are
pleased to promptly disclose positive information. But with re-
spect to bad news, such as the probable failure to meet analysts'
earnings projections or the loss of a major contract, issuers are re-
luctant to make prompt disclosure. The discipline of the market
for companies that fail to meet analysts' expectations has become
118 See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984). The SEC has
issued a number of statements urging companies to make full and prompt public
disclosure of material developments. See, e.g., Timely Disclosure of Material Cor-
porate Developments, Securities Act Release No. 5,092 (Oct. 5, 1970) ("Notwith-
standing the fact that a company complies with [its] reporting requirements, it
still has an obligation to make full and prompt announcements of material facts
regarding the company's financial condition."); accord, Report of Investigation in
the Matter of Sharon Steel Corporation as It Relates to Prompt Public Disclosure,
Exchange Act Release No. 18,271, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,049 (1981). Nonetheless, these pronouncements are merely hortatory
in nature. See MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE
AND SECURITIES LAW PERSPECTvE 19 (1983) (asserting that "the hallmark of the
SEC's exhortatory approach... generally has been that it seeks to ameliorate or
address particular weaknesses in the corporate accountability mechanism without
the imposition of government regulation"); see also 7 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3517 (3d ed. 1991); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclosure of
Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule 10b-5 Analysis, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218, 1264 (1987); Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and
the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 NW. U. L. REV.
1473,1537 (1986).
119 See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984); supra
notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
120 See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 170 n.41 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating
that "it appears that defendants have a duty under Rule 10b-5 to correct state-
ments if those statements have become materially misleading in light of subse-
quent events.").
121 See State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d
Cir. 1981) ("A company has no duty to correct or verify rumors in the marketplace
unless those rumors can be attributed to the company.").
122 See MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW § 10.01 (3d ed.
2001).
123 "Bad news" generally refers to those circumstances that adversely impact
the subject company or the market for its securities.
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commonplace' 24 Although companies likely will incur the wrath
of analysts and other constituencies by delaying disclosure of ma-
terial information, until such adverse information becomes a cer-
tainty with its accompanying negative consequences, it is not sur-
prising that many companies decline to promptly disclose with the
hope that positive developments will ensue.25
The arbitrariness of this "black hole" in the U.S. securities
framework also is illustrated by the fortuity of when the adverse
event transpires. For example, after filing its periodic report on
Form 10-Q126 with the SEC on May 15, the company learns of mate-
rial bad news on May 17. Unless there exists an independent af-
firmative disclosure obligation,1 27 the company has no duty under
the securities laws to disclose this material adverse information
until the filing of its next Form 10-Q on August 15, nearly three
months later. Such delayed disclosure, in the absence of justifiable
business reason, is difficult to reconcile with the perception that the
mandatory disclosure framework in the United States uniformly
promotes market integrity and investor entitlement to material in-
formation.128
Accordingly, the key issue in this setting is one of timing.
Companies understandably wish to delay disclosure of bad news
as long as possible. For example, during the interim when the next
Form 10-Q is due, perhaps new major contracts can be obtained to
replace the ones that were terminated. Prompt disclosure, ac-
cording to management, could induce a "snowball" effect, de-
pressing the corporation's business and the price of its securities12 9
As alluded to above, there is sparse authority to support an af-
firmative obligation to disclose bad news during the period be-
tween SEC mandated reports. Courts have reasoned that the tim-
ing of disclosure normally is a matter of business judgment. Under
124 See, e.g., Robert O'Brien, Compaq's Warning Stings Teds; IBM, Hewlett-
Packard, Dell Fall, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2000, at C4.
P3 See Jonathan Weil, Many Companies Fail to Heed t1w SEC On Its Revenue-
Recognition Guidelines, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2000, at Cl; see also, Marc Steinberg,
supra note 32 § 2.03[1] (opining that the "black hole" "should not be viewed in an
unduly exTansive manner" and that "an issuer's disclosure duties are continual
and comprehensive").
126 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2000).
127 See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
12 See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System, 9 J. CoRP. L 1 (1983).
129 See STEINBERG, supra note 32, § 2.03[6].
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this approach, disclosure may be delayed until the information is
ripe, or withheld if a valid business reason exists, such as where
premature disclosure would impair a contract.130
Even when such business justification is absent, issuers none-
theless generally may delay making disclosure under the U.S. se-
curities laws until the filing of the next SEC periodic report.'31 It
may be argued, however, that where the material information is
ripe and the business justifications are lacking, U.S. law ought to
mandate prompt disclosure.132
Although a company's refusal to disclose material adverse in-
formation for fear of investor response does not justify withhold-
ing disclosure, plausible arguments against the blanket imposition
of an affirmative duty to disclose material adverse information
may be promoted. Coping with the vicissitudes of business is a
basic tenet of entrepreneurship. Corporate management should
retain the flexibility to overcome setbacks. Stockholder confidence
in management's ability to exercise its stewardship is a key basis
underlying shareholders' investment in that enterprise. Moreover,
the securities laws were not designed to stifle management's ability
to run the corporation's daily business operations. In light of these
concerns, the present SEC periodic reporting regime mandates
comprehensive disclosure at specified intervals and also provides
management some breathing room. 33 Allowed time to reflect, the
company may find a means to salvage or replace the "terminated"
contracts or otherwise reverse the setback. Requiring immediate
disclosure may induce panic selling, depressing the corporation's
business and the price of its stock.
As recognized by other countries, 34 however, absent sufficient
business justification, market integrity and investor confidence call
130 See, e.g., Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
131 See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
132 Cf. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984) (setting
forth certain circumstances for mandating disclosure of "soft" information).
133 See STEINBERG, supra note 32, § 2.03[6]; Marc I. Steinberg & Robin M.
Goldman, Issuer Affirmative Disclosure Obligations -An Analytical Framework for
Merger Negotiations, Soft Information, and Bad News, 46 MD. L. REv. 923, 946-951
(1987). Moreover, disclosure of forward-looking information may be required in
SEC periodic reports pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Management Dis-
cussion and Analysis (MD&A). See, e.g., SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 36,
Exchange Act Release No 26,831, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,436 at 62,143 (May
18,1989).
134 See infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
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for adverse material information to be publicly disclosed without
undue delay. The issue is principally one of materiality rather than
one of timing. If there exists no reasonable likely prospect of sig-
nificantly minimizing the material adverse effect of whatever event
occurred, there should be no legitimate basis for delaying disclo-
sure until the next periodic filing. In such event, the fundamental
issue should be whether the subject information is material. In-
vestors should be entitled to such material information to enable
them to protect their financial holdings as they see fit. Prompt dis-
closure normally is critical, because delay can have catastrophic
consequences for investors as well as the integrity of the financial
markets.
The SEC, by leaving it to corporations in the interval between
periodic reports to voluntarily make prompt disclosure of material
information, has slighted investors and its own responsibility to fa-
cilitate the disclosure objectives underlying the securities laws. To
remedy this deficiency, the SEC should amend Form 8-K135 so as to
mandate prompt disclosure of any event which a company knows
or has reason to know will have a material impact on that enter-
prise. Mandated disclosures, for instance, would encompass (if fi-
nancially material): the irretrievable loss of client contracts, known
problems which generate liquidity problems, and the occurrence of
any situation which affects the issuer's net sales, revenues or in-
come.136
Arguably, an exception to such mandated disclosure should be
allowed where there exist an identifiable and rational basis for the
belief that the corporate setback is reasonably likely to be signifi-
cantly minimized in the immediate future, a considered plan for
achieving this goal is diligently implemented, and prompt public
disclosure of the subject information would pose a substantial
probability of harm to the corporation's continued viability. With-
out compliance with the foregoing steps, shareholders and the se-
curities markets are entitled to prompt disclosure of material in-
formation)L37
m 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2000).
136 See STEINBERG, supra note 32, § 2.03[6].
137 Id. See generally Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Gorern-
ance, 62 LAW & CoMIrP. PRoBS. 113,127 (1999) (asserting that corporate govern-
ance will improve in the event that disclosure becomes legally mandated); Mitu
Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coning to an End. Tiw Case of
Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REv. 675 (1999) (discussing a framework under
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2. DEVELOPED MARKETS ABROAD
2.1. Insider Trading
Unlike the United States where the law of insider trading
largely has been formulated by the courts, 38 countries abroad have
enacted specific and detailed legislation defining the contours of
the insider trading prohibition.139 Regardless of this codification
approach, ambiguities exist in such legislation that await judicial or
legislative resolution.140
2.1.1. Use of Statutorily Defined Terms
Unlike the United States, key terms constituting the insider
trading offense are set forth by statute.141 By way of example,, the
United Kingdom ("U.K.") defines inside information as informa-
tion that "(1) relates to particular securities or their issuers; (2) is
specific or precise; (3) has not been made public; and (4) if it were
made public would be likely to have a significant effect on the
price or value of any security."'42 An "insider fact" under German
which one might resolve the question of whether a firm conducting a public of-
fering must disclose information regarding the fiscal quarter in which the offering
takes place); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (1999).
138 See supra notes 21-48 and accompanying text.
139 See infra notes 141-86 and accompanying text.
140 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 142-59 and accompanying text
142 Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA), ch. 36 part V, §§ 56, 60(4), as set forth in
ALISTAIR ALcocK, United Kingdom in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION Vol. 5,
bklt 1, at 27 (Robert Rosen ed. 2001).
In 1989, the Council of the European Communities promulgated the European
Economic Community Directive Coordinating Regulation on Insider Trading.
Council Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on In-
sider Dealing, 1989 O.J. (L 344) 30 (the "Directive"). The Directive, for example,
sets forth minimum standards for defining the concepts of "inside information"
and "insider" with respect to which Member States of the European Union must
comply. Supra art. 5. Nonetheless, significant details regarding methods of en-
forcement are left principally to the Member States. Directive, supra, art. 8; see
ISABELLE PINGEL, The EC Directive of 1989, in INSIDER TRADING: THE LAws OF EUROPE,
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 5, 5-6 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed. 1992).
Article 1 of the Directive provides that inside information is "information
which has not been made public of a precise nature.., which, if it were made
public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the.., security."
Directive, supra, art. 1. Article 2 sets forth that an insider is "any person who...
by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory
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law is "knowledge of a fact not publicly known relating to one or
more issuers of insider securities or to insider securities and which
fact is capable of substantially influencing the price of the insider
securities in the event of it becoming publicly known." 43 For in-
sider trading purposes, "privileged information" under Mexican
law is that "arising from the issuer and not available to the public,
the knowledge of which may influence the prices of securities is-
sued by such corporation or another corporation." 144 Other coun-
tries similarly define by statute the elements of an inside fact or
privileged information.1 45 In addition, other key concepts are de-
fined by statute, including, for instance, those persons who are
deemed: insiders, to have a "special relationship" with the com-
pany, or to have "access" to inside information.1 46
bodies of the issuer, by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or because
he has access ... by virtue of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties,
possesses inside information [and takes] advantage of that information with full
knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for the
account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, transferable securities of the
issuer... to which that information relates." Directive, supra, art. 2. Article 4
provides that a "secondary insider" is "any person [other than a primary insider]
who with full knowledge of the facts possesses inside information, the direct or
indirect source of which could not be other than a [primary insider].' Directive,
supra, art. 4.
The Directive, providing minimum standards only, leaves to the judgment of
the Member States whether to adhere to more stringent requirements than those
promulgated in the Directive. Directive, supra, art. 6. The Directive mandates that
each Member State designate competent authorities "to ensure that the provisions
adopted pursuant to [the] Directive are applied [and that those authorities] be
given all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise
of their functions." Directive, supra, art. 6. The Directive declines to require
whether administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be implemented by
each Member State for enforcement purposes. Rather, Article 13 provides that
"[e]ach Member State shall determine the penalties to be applied for infringement
of the measures taken pursuant to [the] Directive." Pincus at 6-21; STEINBERG, Su-
pra note 1, at 122-123.
143 Securities Act § 13; see Tony Hickinbotham & Christoph Vaupel, Germany,
in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 129, 134 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds.,
1996).
144 Securities Market Law art. 16-Bis; see Antje Zaldivar, Mexco, in
INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 63, 64-67 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds.,
1996).
145 See, e.g., Commission des Op.rations de Bourse ("COB"), Regulation No.
90-08 (Fr.); Consolidated Act on Financial Intermediation Art. 180, para. 3, imple-
mented by CONSOB Regulation No. 11520 (Italy). See also STEINBERG, supra note 1,
at 130-32,138-39.
146 See, e.g., Directive, supra; Corporations Law § 1002G(1) (Austl.); Securities
Act R.S.O., ch. S-S, § 76(1), 76(5) (1991) (Can.).
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Note that a number of interpretive issues remain under these
statutes. Under the U.K. framework, for example, when is infor-
mation "specific or precise" rather than general or not specific? Is
information relating to the issuer engaging in relatively prelimi-
nary merger negotiations with a prospective suitor precise or not
sufficiently specific for purposes of the statute?147 Under German
law, when is a fact not publicly known so as to become an "insider
fact"?148 And, under Mexican law, with respect to the term "privi-
leged information," under what circumstances is such information
deemed to "arise from the issuer"? Does the statute encompass
purely nonpublic market information relating to an issuer (rather
than internal corporate information) that influences the subject se-
curity's trading price?149
Also, contrary to the U.S. definition, the concept of materiality
is connected to the information's impact on market price.5 0 The
U.S. standard, focusing on whether the subject information would
147 The ambiguity of the United Kingdom's definition of inside information
has been criticized. See MARK STAMP & CARSON WELSH, United Kingdom, in
INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 91, 100 (1996). Note that the French judiciary has
held that "privileged information" encompasses negotiations relating to a pro-
spective takeover offer by a French company seeking to acquire the securities of a
publicly-held U.S. corporation. See CA Paris, 6 July 1994, Les Petites Affiches (Pe-
tites Affiches) No. 137, 16 Nov. 1994, p. 17, note Ducouloux-Favard, discussed in
Patricia Peterson, France, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 152,156 (Mark Stamp
& Carson Welsh eds., 1996).
148 See Hartmut Krause, The German Securities Trading Act (1994): A Ban on In-
sider Trading and an Issuer's Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Nonpublic Informa-
tion, 30 INT'L LAW. 555, 562 (1996) ("Neither the German Act nor the EC Insider
Trading Directive offer guidance as to when information should be considered
known to the public."). For a comparison, see the Australian Corporations Law,
which states that information is generally available if-
(a) it consists of readily observable matter; or (b) without limit-
ing the generality of paragraph (a), both the following subpara-
graphs apply: (i) it has been made known in a manner that
would, or would be likely to, bring it to the attention of persons
who commonly invest in securities of bodies corporate of a kind
whose price or value might be affected by the information; and
(ii) since it was so made known, a reasonable period for it to be
disseminated among such persons has elapsed.)
Corporations Law § 1002B(2). (Austl.)
149 A construction limiting the statute to internal corporate information aris-
ing from the subject issuer would be unduly narrow, allowing a large gap in the
Mexican securities framework. Cf. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)
(applying Exchange Act § 10(b) to material inside information arising from pro-
spective takeover bidder).
150 See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
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assume importance to the mythical "reasonable" investor in mak-
ing his investment decision,'5  has not been adopted with great
frequency elsewhere. 52 To illustrate the widespread rejection of
the U.S. definition of materiality, the laws of the following juris-
dictions focus their inquiry on the information's effect on the mar-
ket price of the subject security: (Ontario) Canada,15 Mexico, 54
United Kingdom, 55 France, 56 Germany,57 Italy,SS and Australia. 5 9
Indeed, relatively few countries, such as Japan,'6 0 follow the U.S.
approach.
Hence, although awaiting judicial clarification for unresolved
issues, the insider trading statutes outside of the United States set
forth the key terms and definitions that comprise the offense. As
will be examined below, the fiduciary duty (or trust and confi-
dence) analysis embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court has been
broadly rejected elsewhere.161
151 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1938).
152 See Article I of the EC Directive on Insider Trading, supra note 142; infa
notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
15 Securities Act, R.S.O. ch. S-5, § 1(1) (1990) (Can.) (defining a material fact
as a "fact that significantly affects or would reasonably be expected to have a sig-
nificant effect on, the market price or value of securities [of the subject issuer].").
Note that there is no federal securities law in Canada. Rather, regulation is pro-
vided by each of that country's ten provinces and two territories. The Ontario se-
curities legislation is viewed as the most significant and will be used as the exem-
plar in this article. See generally, Philip Anisman, Te Proposals for a Seurities
Market Lawbfor Canada: Purpose and Process, 19 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 329 (1931).
154 Securities Market Law art. 16-Bis.
155 Criminal Justice Act § 60(4).
1s6 Commission des Operations de Bourse Art. 1 (defining privileged infor-
mation as "any precise non-public information... which, if made public, might
affect the price of the security.").
157 Securities Act § 13.
153 Consolidated Act on Financiil Intermediation Art. 180, para. 3. Cf. former
Law No. 157 art. 3. See Casella, Italy, in INSIDER TRADING: THE LAWs OF EuRoPE,
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 109, 112-13 (E. Gaillard ed., 1992). See generally
Eugenio Ruggiero, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Italy, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L
157 (1996).
1s9 Corporations Law § 1002G(1) (setting forth that the information, if it were
generally available, "might have a material effect on the price or value of [the
subject] securities").
160 Securities and Exchange Law art. 166, para. 2 (defining material facts as
encompassing those facts "which may have significant influence on the invest-
ment decisions of investors"); see STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 146 (and sources
cited therein).
161 See infra notes 162-86 and accompanying text.
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2.1.2. General Adherence to the "Access" Standard
Not surprisingly, other jurisdictions soundly have rejected the
U.S. fiduciary relationship (or relationship of trust and confidence)
model to define the scope of illegal insider trading and tipping.1 62
First, the U.S. approach focuses on the presence or absence of rela-
tively complex inquiries to ascertain whether the insider trading
proscription prevails in the particular setting. For example: Is
there a fiduciary relationship present? 63 What type of relationship
is deemed to be fiduciary or one of trust and confidence? 64 Who is
a quasi-insider and under what circumstances?1 65 What facts must
be shown for there to be misappropriation of the subject informa-
tion?166 Must the inside trader in fact "use" or merely be "in pos-
session of" the subject information at the time of the transac-
tion(s)?167 What must be established to prove that one tipped for
"personal benefit" and what constitutes an "improper personal
benefit?" 168 To leave these inquiries to ad hoc adjudication and oc-
casional SEC rulemaking169 may be tolerable for the United States
with its zest for litigation and its abundance of lawyers, regulators,
and judges. Such an approach, representing the antithesis of cost-
effectiveness, justifiably garners little support elsewhere. 170
Moreover, as a matter of fairness, the U.S. framework has sig-
nificant loopholes. For example, should the loose-lipped executive
and her tippees avoid insider trading liability when those tippees
knowingly trade on material nonpublic information?' 71 Should
one be criminally convicted or be totally exonerated on the sole
162 See infra notes 176-86 and accompanying text.
163 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); supra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text
164 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); supra
notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
165 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
166 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); United States v. Chest-
man, 947 F.2d 551.
167 See SEC Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2001); supra notes 52-53, 81
and accompanying text
168 See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984); supra notes 59-65
and accompanying text
169 See, e.g., SEC Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1,
240.10b5-2 (2001); supra notes 52-53, 74-77 and accompanying text.
170 See infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
171 Today, such conduct is governed by Regulation FD. See supra notes 84-115
and accompanying text
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distinction whether the confidential information related to a tender
offer rather than a merger transaction? 72 Should a close relative or
good friend be able to legally trade on material nonpublic infor-
mation when he inadvertently learns of such information when
visiting the insider at her home or office? 73 By adhering to a fidu-
ciary relationship like-model that has been rejected by the SEC in
the tender offer scenario, 74 the U.S. insider trading approach un-
duly complicates an already complex area and at times smacks of
unfairness among similarly situated market participants. 75
For these reasons, many countries opt for an insider trading
proscription premised on the "access" doctrine. 76 As a generali-
zation, this standard prohibits insider trading by those who have
unequal access to the material nonpublic information. This con-
cept may extend the insider trading prohibition to tippees who re-
ceive the subject information from traditional insiders or others
who, due to their office, employment, or profession, have access to
such information.77 This general approach is implemented by
such jurisdictions as, for example, the United Kingdom 73
France,179 Germany, 80 Italy,'8' (Ontario) Canada, 8 2 and Mexico.13
172 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); supra
notes 58-83 and accompanying text.
173 Cf. T.G.I. Paris, Oct 15, 1976, J.C.P. 1977, 11, 18543 (architect deemed in-
sider due to his becoming privy to confidential information while visiting his cli-
ent's office), discussed in Dominique Borde, France, in INSIDER TRADING riN WEIVTErN
EUROPE: CURRENT STATUS 59, 65 (Gerhard Wegen & Heinz-Dieter Assmann eds.,
1994).
174 See Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2001); supra notes 45-48 and accom-
panying text.
17- See supra notes 49-83 and accompanying text.
176 EC Directive on Insider Trading, note 142 supra; infra notes 178-83 and ac-
companying text.
177 EC Directive on Insider Trading, note 142 supra.
178 See Criminal Justice Act §§ 52,57; infra note 188 and accompanying text.
179 Hence, under Regulation 90-08, the following are defined as insiders:
(a) [P]ersons holding privileged information by reason of their capacity
as members of management, board of directors of an issuer, or by reason
of their functions which they exercise with respect to an issuer;, (b)
[plersons holding privileged information by reason of the planning and
execution of a financial operation; (c) [p]ersons to whom privileged in-
formation is disclosed during the exercise of their professional activities
or functions; and (d) [p]ersons who, with full knowledge of the facts,
possess privileged information originating directly or indirectly from
[any of the foregoing insiders].
Regulation 90-08. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 138.
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A significantly smaller number of jurisdictions opt for an ex-
pansive approach premised on the parity of information princi-
ple.184 For example, Australia's prohibition against insider trading
generally extends to any person or entity who possesses confiden-
tial price sensitive information.185 Under the Australian frame-
work, one is deemed an insider, thereby becoming subject to the
insider trading and tipping proscriptions, by "(a) possess[ing] in-
formation that is not generally available but, if the information
were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to
have a material effect on the price or value of securities of a body
corporate; and (b) ... know[ing], or ought reasonably know[ing]
that (i) the information is not generally available; and (ii) if it were
generally available, it might have a material effect on the price or
value of those securities." 186
2.1.3. Tipping Liability
With respect to tipping, like the liability of insiders and access
persons for trading, the U.S. approach has been thoroughly re-
jected. The standards adopted by other jurisdictions cover a wide
spectrum. At one end, for example, is Australia that subjects any
tippee (regardless how remote), who knowingly possesses material
nonpublic information, from trading on or tipping such informa-
tion.187 Similarly, the United Kingdom imposes a broad prohibi-
tion against trading and tipping for those who knowingly receive
material nonpublic information, directly or indirectly, from an in-
sider.188 Perhaps at the other end of the spectrum is Mexico whose
180 Securities Act § 13(1). See generally Krause, supra note 148; von Dryander,
The German Securities Trading Act: Insider Trading and Other Secondary Market
Regulation, 9 Insights No. 1, at 26 (1995).
181 Consolidated Act on Financial Intermediation, art. 180, para. 3. See
STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 132.
182 Securities Act R.S.C. ch.S-5, § 76(5) (1990) (Can.).
183 Securities Market Law art. 16-Bis.-1; see Zaldivar, supra note 144, at 66.
184 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc); supra note 25 and accompanying text.
185 See Corporations Law § 1002G.
186 Id.; see STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 142.
187 Id.; see Roman Tomasic & Stephen Bottomley, Corporations Lao, in
AUSTRALIA 698-99 (The Federation Press, 1995); see generally PAUL REDMOND,
COMPANIES AND SECURITIES LAW (2d ed. 1992).
188 Criminal Justice Act §§ 52, 57. See Tim Herrington & Jason Glover, The
United Kingdom, in INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE: CURRENT STATUS 33, 43
[Vol. 22:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss3/4
INSIDER TRADING
securities law regime declines to impose liability on tippers as well
as tippees.169
A number of other countries have approaches that are more
straightforward than the U.S. standard but at times not as encom-
passing. Under German law, for instance, primary insiders neither
may trade nor tip. Recipients of material nonpublic information
communicated by a primary insider, while subject to the trading
proscription, are not themselves precluded from tipping the sub-
ject information to others. 90 France,'91 Italy,'92 and Japan9l 3 have
similar provisions.
2.2. Issuer Selective Disclosure Practices
Under the U.S. insider trading regime, illegal tipping under
Section 10(b) occurs when an insider tips for personal benefit The
difficulty of establishing such personal benefit along with the
(Gerhard Wegen & Heinz-Dieter Assmann eds., 1994); Stamp & Welsh, supra note
147, at 109.
1S9 See Securities Market Law art. 16-Bis 1. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 121
(stating that "[o]ne major criticism of the Mexican securities law regime is that it
fails to provide liability for those who disclose privileged information to tippers
and for tippees who trade on the basis of privileged information.").
190 Securities Act § 14(1)-(2). See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 128-29:
Primary insiders are prohibited from trading on inside information for
their own account or for the account of others, conveying inside infor-
mation to others without proper authorization, and making recommen-
dations to a third party to trade based upon inside information (tipping).
Secondary insiders are prohibited from trading for their own account or
for the account of others. Unlike primary insiders, secondary insiders
are neither prohibited from disclosing information to other people nor
from tipping. However, the recipients of such information would then
become secondary insiders (tippees) and thus would be prohibited from
trading on the inside information for their own account or for the ac-
count of others. Nonetheless, tippees can continue to pass along inside
information provided that they do not trade on it themselves or for the
account of others. This result may be explained as a means of facilitating
the free flow of information in order to more expeditiously transform
non-public inside information into public information.
Id.; see sources cited supra, notes 143,180.
191 Commission des Op&xations de Bourse Regulation 90-0S arts. 2-5; art.
10-1 of Ordinance No. 67-833. See Borde, supra note 173, at 66-69.
192 Consolidated Act on Financial Intermediation No. 58, art. 180, paras. 1, 2,
discussed in Steinberg, supra note 1, at 132-33.
193 Securities and Exchange Law art. 166, paras. 1, 3; see Toshio Kobayashi et
al, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 321, 334-35 (Mark Stamp & Carson
Welsh eds., 1996).
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practice of companies selectively disclosing material nonpublic in-
formation to financial analysts and other favored market partici-
pants prompted the SEC to promulgate Regulation FD.194
In established securities markets outside of the United States,
there should exist no impetus for adopting a special proscription
against selective disclosure. That is because selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information normally constitutes illegal tip-
ping, and, hence, already is proscribed by statute.19 Stated differ-
ently, conveyance of material nonpublic information by insiders to
select persons, such as financial analysts (where no justifiable busi-
ness reason exists for such disclosure and where the recipient is not
subject to a confidentiality understanding), constitutes unlawful
tipping under the statutory law of developed securities markets in
the world.196
2.3. Issuer Affirmative and Timely Disclosure Practices
As discussed above, unless subject to specified affirmative dis-
closure obligations, U.S. securities law does not require companies
to disclose material information in the interval between the filing
of SEC periodic reports.197 The timing of disclosure during this pe-
riod generally is left to management's discretion.198 Is this ap-
proach generally adhered to in other developed markets? The an-
swer evidently is no. Under the laws of other jurisdictions, absent
sufficient business justification, publicly-held issuers on a continu-
ous basis must promptly and timely disclose material matters to
the securities marketplace.'9 9 For example, pursuant to the United
Kingdom's framework, any information that will cause a substan-
tial movement in the price of a subject company's securities must
be immediately released.20 In Canada, if any material
194 See supra notes 84-115 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
196 See, e.g., the German Securities Act § 14(1)-(2), supra note 190 and accom-
panying text
197 See supra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
200 See Laurence James, Securities Law in the United Kingdom, in INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 209, 215 (Karl-Eduard von der Heydt & Stanley Keller
eds., 1995). Subject companies generally are those entities whose securities are
traded on the primary market of the London Stock Exchange, known as the "Offi-
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change01 occurs in the interval between required statements, a
subject issuer must make timely disclosure in regard thereto by
means of press release.2 °2 Listed companies in Germany similarly
are subject to continuous reporting obligations, thereby mandating
prompt disclosure of material information. -0 3 Likewise, Australia
mandates that listed issuers notify the stock exchange of material
matters as they occur.204
This approach requiring prompt public disclosure of material
information on a continuous basis is the preferred route. Jurisdic-
tions outside of the United States with developed securities mar-
kets have rejected the U.S. position in favor of a continuous disclo-
sure regime.20 The International Organization of Securities
Commissions ("IOSCO)206 also advocates for continuous disclo-
sure by issuers of material information. In its Objectives and Prin-
cial List" Id. at 209. Similar to the United States, the United Kingdom's approach
is based on full disclosure of material information to investors and the securities
markets. See STEPHEN W. MAYSON ET AL., MAYSON, FRENCH & RYAN ON COMPANY
LAW 185 (13th ed. 1996).
201 Securities Act R.S.C. ch.S-5, § 1(1)21 (1990) (Can.) (defining "material
change" as a "change in the business, operations or capital of an issuer that would
reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of
the security of the issuer."). See 10C INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKM AND
SEcuRrIIEs REGULATION at 4-59 (-L Bloomenthal & S. Wolff eds., 1996). This obli-
gation has been expanded by Canadian securities regulators to include disclosure
of "material information." See GLOBAL OFFERINGS OF SEcURITIES: AccEss TO Worw
EQUITY CAPITAL MARKErs 110 (M. Brown & A. Paley eds., 1994).
202 See Securities Act R.S.C. ch.S-5, § 75(1) (1990) (Can.).
20 See Gesetz fiber den Wertpapierhandel (Wertpaierhandelsgesatz, v. 26.7
1994 (§ 15) (FRG); Krause, supra note 148, at 582-85. Note that Members of the EC
are bound by the Council Directives. Each Member may elect to decide the
method of implementation. The EC Admissions Directive mandates continuing
reporting obligations. See Council Directive No. 79/279,1979 O.J. (L 66) Schedule
C §§ 2(a), 2(b), 4(a), 5(a), 6(a), at 30-1 (requiring, inter alia, that "the issuer inform
the public as soon as possible of material current developments"); Mare I. Stein-
berg & Lee E.Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdic-
tional Approaches, Commonality and Redprocity, 20 MIcH. J. INTL L 207,256 (1999).
204 See 10E INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKErs, supra note 201, at Gen. 3-28.
Other countries, including France and Italy, have adopted similar standards. See
Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 203, at 220,226 (and authorities cited therein).
20 See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
206 See generally A. A. Sommer, Jr., IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17
Nw. J. INT'LL. & BUS. 15 (1996) (discussing the formation and purposes of IO5CO);
Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 203, at 238-46.
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ciples of Securities Regulation, 207 IOSCO takes the following posi-
tion: "Investors should be provided with the information neces-
sary to make informed decisions on an ongoing basis. The principle
of full, timely and accurate disclosure of current and reliable infor-
mation material to investment decisions is directly related to the
objectives of investor protection and fair, efficient and transparent
markets." 208
By deferring to management's judgment to determine the
timing of disclosure during the interval between the filing of peri-
odic reports, the U.S. securities laws lag behind those of other de-
veloped countries as well as IOSCO's position.2 9 Although issuer
delay in making disclosure of material information without busi-
ness justification may violate self-regulatory organization ("SRO")
rules, SROs rarely enforce these rules against subject issuers.210
Given the competition among the exchanges and the NASDAQ for
enticing and then retaining companies to list their securities with
the respective SRO, this lack of SRO enforcement should be ex-
pected.21n
3. COMMENTS FAVORING U.S. REGULATION
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the U.S. approach with
respect to insider trading and timely disclosure lags behind other
established markets in terms of promoting investor protection and
market integrity. Nonetheless, in practical reality, the U.S. regime
is viewed as preeminent irrespective of its shortcomings. The suc-
cinct explanation is the implementation of an effective enforcement
and remedial U.S. framework that receives widespread support by
market participants as well as the general populace.212
As seen by the experiences of many countries, statutes that im-
pose strict standards (such as with respect to insider trading and
issuer timely disclosure) are meaningful only to the extent that
2u International Organization of Securities Commissions, Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation (1998), IOSCO Document Library, available at
http://www.IOSCO.org/docs-public/1998-objectives.html.
208 Id. at pt 111, 10.3 (emphasis added), available at http://www.IOSCO.org/
docs-public/1998-objectives.html/.
209 See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text
210 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
211 See Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing
Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461 (1992).
212 See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 259.
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they are enforced with some regularity. The lack or inadequacy of
effective government personnel, resources, and surveillance poses
little deterrent to prospective violators. Consequently, competent
staff must be retained by the applicable regulator and be provided
with the appropriate resources to conduct meaningful surveillance
and prosecution.213 This commitment has not been forthcoming
with great vigor by several countries that have more rigorous
standards than the United States.214
Along with this much relaxed enforcement of statutorily strict
standards in the applicable country often is found cultural atti-
tudes acquiescing in insider trading and issuer selective disclosure
practices m5 Such practices are perceived by affected participants
as embedded in that securities market and as a way that business
relations have been conducted for decades (if not centuries). 6
This attitude may deter regulators from initiating actions against
purportedly distinguished business executives who are often
viewed with admiration and respect. Principal reliance on a crimi-
nal mode of enforcement (due to that many countries do not ade-
quately provide for civil enforcement by either the government or
allegedly aggrieved private parties) 217 may accentuate this reluc-
tanceX 8 Respected executives thus are faced with penal sanctions
in a culture that has not embraced the evils of such "gentlemen"
213 Id. at 261.
214 See, e.g., Roman Tomasic, Insider Trading Laew Reform in Australia, 9
CoMPANY & SEc. L.J. 121 (1991).
215 For example, although having a relatively detailed insider trading pro-
scription, South Africa has initiated few, if any, criminal prosecutions. See Franco
H. van Zyl, South Africa: Insider Trading Regulation and Enforcement, 15 COMPANY
LAW. INT'L 92 (1994). Although viewed as doing more to combat insider trading
than most jurisdictions, "prosecution of insider trading [in Canada] remains
minimal." Nasser, The Morality of Insider Trading in the United States and Abroad, 52
OKLA. L. REv. 377, 385 (1999). With respect to Japan, that country is perceived as
an "'insider's heaven' where people rampantly profit from inside information
with little detection or prosecution." Id. at 382, quoting, Tomoko Akashi, Regula-
tion of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1296,1302 n.45 (1989).
216 See Andre Tunc, A French Launer Looks at American Corporation Laws and
Securities Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 757, 762 (1982) (stating that in France tip-
ping of material nonpublic information is perceived as "a social duty... expected
of relatives and friends."); sources cited supra note 215.
217 See, e.g., Nasser, supra note 215, at 380-84; Note, T7 Regulation of Insider
Trading in Japan: Introducing a Private Right of Action, 73 WASH. U. L Q. 1399 (1995);
STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 148 (Japan).
218 See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 264.
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offenses. 219 Courts also play a key role in this process, often refus-
ing to convict a defendant on the basis of circumstantial evidence 220
and imposing relatively lenient sanctions when guilt has been es-
tablished.221 Although recent developments in certain countries
suggest that more successful surveillance and enforcement prac-
tices are being deployed,22 a long road must be traversed to ap-
proach the effectiveness of U.S. civil and criminal enforcement.223
Hence, irrespective of the apparent laxity and confusion in the
U.S. law of insider trading and issuer prompt disclosure, the U.S.
regime remains preeminent. The SEC's important role as regula-
tor, with its capable personnel, resources, and surveillance, is per-
haps the most significant ingredient comprising effective enforce-
ment of the U.S. securities laws.224 In addition, enhanced criminal
prosecution for insider trading has become an accepted component
of the enforcement landscape.225 As a further layer of enforcement,
allegedly aggrieved traders may institute civil actions seeking
damages against those who illegally trade on the basis of or tip
material nonpublic information.226
The impropriety of insider trading and like offenses227 is gener-
ally accepted by market participants, the public, and the judiciary.
In other words, unlike many other countries, the cultural attitudes
prevalent in the U.S. favor relatively rigorous enforcement and
219 Id.
220 See Marie McDonald & Blake Dawson Waldron, Australia, in
INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 439, 442 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds.,
1996); Roman Tomasic & Brendan Pentony, The Prosecution of Insider Trading: Ob-
stacles to Enforcement, 22 AUST'L. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 65, 65-66 (1989).
221 In Germany, the first conviction for insider trading was not procured until
1995. Moreover, no prison sentence was ordered. See German Insider-Trading
Probe, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1995, at A6. See also Ex-Lawyer Gets Suspended Term for
Insider Trading, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, July 28,1997.
M See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 121-40, 214-37.
m See Nasser, supra note 215, at 377 (stating that in addition to Canada and
Japan, "insider trading seems to go largely unpunished in Australia, France, Ger-
many, and Mexico").
224 See DAVID A. VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET (1991).
22 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994); United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct.
2199 (1997).
226 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(E) (1994); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d
156 (2d Cir. 1980).
227 Such offenses include stock manipulation, parking of securities, and
"scalping." See generally NORMAN POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION
(1995).
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prosecution of these offenses.22 Judges contribute to this atmos-
phere by upholding insider trading convictions based on circum-
stantial evidence229 and by, pursuant to the federal sentencing
guidelines,23 0 imposing lengthy periods of incarceration where cir-
cumstances warrant 231 Thus, as compared to other jurisdictions,
U.S. enforcement in this area is effective, thereby inducing law
compliance232 and facilitating market integrity.2 33
4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
U.S. regulation of insider trading as well as issuer timely dis-
closure practices is far from ideal. Without adequate justification,
ambiguity, complexity and uneven treatment of similarly situated
market participants too often prevail. Perhaps recognizing these
shortcomings, countries with developed securities markets largely
have declined to adhere to U.S. standards on these subjects. The
approaches adopted by many countries abroad thus represent an
effort to provide dear statutory direction with respect to the in-
sider trading proscription as well as issuer timely disclosure. Fo-
cusing on the statutes by themselves, these countries may have
achieved their objectives. 234
Nonetheless, due to such deficiencies as inadequate funding,
personnel, resources, and surveillance, ineffective enforcement
228 See Nasser, supra note 215, at 388-93. See generally W. Wang & M. Stein-
berg, supra note 10.
M29 See, e.g., SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir. 2000) ("'Circumstantial
evidence, if it meets all the other criteria of admissibility, is just as appropriate as
direct evidence...!"), quoting United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
1998). Accord SEC v. Euro Security Fund, 2000 WL 1376246 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
250 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1994); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998. See generally Paul H. Robinson, 77w Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten
Years Later, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1231 (1997) (summarizing the papers presented at a
symposium on federal sentencing guidelines).
231 See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 653-56 (8th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83,90-91 (2d Cir. 1997).
232 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 807-909.
233 Id. at 547-672; Nasser, supra note 215, at 388-94; John J. Phelan, Jr., Integrity
Is a Necessity on Wall Street, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 1987, at 29. But -e- Jeffrey M.
Laderman The Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. WIVY, Apr. 29, 1985, 78, 80-81. Se
generally JONATHAN I MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: EcoNOMIcs, PoLucs AND Poulcy
(1991); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Lao of Insider Trading, 78
TEx. L. REv. 375 (1999) (discussing the importance and possible methods of recti-
fying insider trading).
234 See supra notes 141-208 and accompanying text.
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generally has been predominant in markets abroad. Laws nor-
mally are as potent as their effective implementation. The deter-
rent impact of rigorous statutes recedes drastically as the likeli-
hood of successful usage lessens. Hence, statutes that are intended
to enhance market integrity and investor protection have relatively
negligible effect if there exists widespread noncompliance. The
lack of successful enforcement thereby facilitates disobedience by
market participants with applicable statutory mandates.2M
This scenario explains why the U.S. markets are perhaps the
most admired in the world. As discussed above, the legal pre-
scriptions, at least those relating to insider trading and issuer
timely disclosure, are not without their shortcomings. Although
far from ideal, the standards adopted are perceived as within the
range of acceptability and have become embedded in the ethos of
the U.S. capital markets. Even more significant, these standards
are effectively enforced by the U.S. SEC, the U.S. Department of
Justice in criminal proceedings, and private litigants who seek
damages from alleged violators. Hence, reasonably effective en-
forcement of statutory, judicial, and regulatory pronouncements
that define specified conduct as being unlawful enhances compli-
ance with the rule of law as well as investor confidence in market
integrity.
Many countries, including those that are members of the Euro-
pean Community, are devoting significantly greater resources to-
ward successful implementation of their statutory mandates relat-
ing to abusive practices such as insider trading. Sufficient
allocation of resources, of course, encompasses procuring adequate
funding, personnel, and technological surveillance mechanisms.
Agendas also should include educational or "enlightenment" mis-
sions to stress the importance of these statutory prohibitions to af-
fected constituencies, such as corporate insiders, bankers, legisla-
tors, judges, and the investing public. Once reasonably successful
enforcement of legal mandates ensues and is perceived in that
fashion by market participants, the affected country's securities
markets will be deemed more attractive as a forum for both capital
raising and investment purposes.
235 See Bernard Black, The Core Institutions That Support Strong Securities Mar-
kets, 55 Bus. LAW. 1565, 1576-578 (2000); Marc I. Steinberg, Emerging Capital Mar-
kets: Proposals and Recommendations for Implementation, 30 INT'L LAW. 715, 723-25
(1996).
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